Abstract Attention scarcity is a limitation on the ability to incorporate information into actions with state-contingent consequences. In a menu choice setting, we study an axiomatic model of decision making with scarce attention. A decision maker satisfying our axioms acts as if she chooses a joint distribution over a product space of states and signals. The decision maker uses information from the joint distribution to make better ex-post choices from menus, and attention scarcity is reflected in a subjective cost of information. Our focus on ex-ante preferences allows us to identify anticipated attention scarcity from choice behavior, and thereby clarify the decision theoretic foundations of rational inattention models proposed in Sims (1998 Sims ( , 2003 .
Introduction
In the age of the Internet, smart phones, and the 24 hour news cycle, an abundance of information is available at the push of a button. Introspection should suffice to attest that people's ability to assimilate the wealth of valuable, external information into their actions is constrained by limitations on information processing. Time is money, attention is scarce, and people must allocate their attention to the information they deem most relevant to the decision problems that they face.
information to reduce a posteriori uncertainty before making choices. Inspired by the information theory literature (Shannon, 1948) , information from processing external data is modeled in terms of the dependence between signals and states in a joint distribution on a (state × signal) product space. Rationality is reflected in the assumption that the decision maker (DM) can choose the joint distribution optimally for the decision problem that they face. Inattention is reflected in costs or constraints of information gain. The appeal of formalizing inattention as a choice over joint distributions subject to information costs, is that limitations on attention can be incorporated into the general decision problem of an optimizing agent without having to specify the details of how information is processed. As a result, models with rationally inattentive agents have been widely applied (e.g., in monetary economics, industrial organization, and finance) and are currently an active area of research (see, e.g., Wiederholt, 2010; Veldkamp, 2011 , for review and references).
A challenge, from a decision theoretic point of view, is that the choice of a joint distributionunlike an action, consumption bundle, or portfolio -is not observable. The selection, organization, and reaction to information may be observable in principle, but opening up the Pandora's box of how a DM processes information circumvents the very appeal of the rational inattention approach. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a framework to study rational inattention based on choice data alone. 1 By focusing on preferences before the realization of states, we do not need to observe how the DM uses information but, instead, characterize choice rules for a DM who acts as if she anticipates choosing joint distributions over (states × signals) under costs of information gain. Our axiomatic analysis therefore leads to a deeper understanding of the behavioral foundations of rational inattention.
Preview of the decision problem
Our decision domain is a variation on the menu choice problem first proposed by Kreps (1979) to study preference for flexibility, and used extensively in the recent decision theory literature on subjective state spaces (Dekel et al., 2001) , self-control problems (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001 ), contemplation and thinking costs (Ergin and Sarver, 2010; Ortoleva, 2012) , minmax regret (Stoye, 1 After completing our manuscript, we became aware of independent, similar contributions by Ellis (2012) and De Oliveira (2012). Ellis (2012) also presents a decision model motivated by rational inattention, but in terms of decision environment, axioms and representation his approach is very different to ours. The work of De Oliveira (2012) seems close to ours and contains a representation for what we call preferences with variable attention in this paper. However, his method of proof differs substantially from ours, and his representation does not capture inattention in the reduced form proposed by Sims (1998 Sims ( , 2003 , via a joint distributions on a (state × signal) product space. Instead, De Oliveira (2012) provides a representation in which the DM choose a distribution over posterior distributions with subjective costs, a representation from which the connection to Sims' model of rational inattention is not as apparent. We have also seen only an early draft of his paper, that does not demonstrate that mutual information is a special case of information costs, or represent alternative forms of (in)attention, as in our constrained attention, fixed attention and comparative statics results. 2011), and subjective learning (Lleras, 2010; Dillinberger and Sadowski, 2011) .
There is a finite set, S, of states of the world. A DM faces choice problems both before and after the realization of a state s ∈ S. Ex-ante the DM chooses over menus of Anscombe-Aumann type acts. An act is a mapping from S into lotteries over a set of consequences. A menu is a finite collection of such acts. Rational inattention manifests ex-post, when the DM processes information about the realized state to make a better choice from the menu. However, since the DM's knowledge about the state depends on her ability to process information, choices in different states of the world will now be random variables, and therefore not observable. Instead, we therefore focus on the ex-ante preferences over menus -which reflect preferences over the type of decision problems the DM would like to face ex-post -and ask when such preferences reveal the anticipation of inattention in an unmodeled choice from menus in the future. The timeline in Figure 1 summarizes the order of events.
[5] Choice from menu 
Preview of the representation
For a rational agent facing a subjective cost of information processing, preferences over menus allow us to characterize the observable implications of anticipated inattention. In particular, we provide an axiomatic representation theorem for the preferences of a DM who evaluates a menu M according to the following utility functional:
where Eu is a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function on lotteries, Σ is a countably infinite space of signals, ∆(S × Σ) is the set of all joint distributions on the (state × signal) product space, and c is an information cost function.
In the background is the interpretation that the DM decides ex-ante on a plan for allocating scarce attention before making ex-post choices from menu M . 2 But (in)attention is captured formally by the utility functional (1) in the reduced form proposed by Sims (1998 Sims ( , 2003 , via the choice of a joint distribution on states and signals. Of course, the signal space Σ itself is not a primitive in our setting; it is an endogenous construction of the representation that obtains the meaning of a signal space only through the choice of a joint distribution p ∈ ∆(S × Σ), and through the manner in which the DM utilizes the information that latent signals convey about states.
In particular, the DM uses information in joint distributions as a Bayesian expected utility maximizer. Corresponding to each joint distribution p ∈ ∆(S × Σ), there is a family of likelihood function for observations on signals, p(.|s). After observing a signal, the DM translates the information from the likelihood of signals into a posterior over the state space, p(.|σ), via Bayes rule. She then chooses from menu M the act that maximizes her expected utility for the posterior. The realized state affects the likelihood of signal realizations and, hence, the information which the posterior distribution contains about the true state. Since the realized state is a priori uncertain, the DM uses the marginal p S ∈ ∆(S) to calculate the expected value of the ex-post choices from the menu.
Inattention comes from the subjective cost c associated with information contained in joint distributions. The properties of c are therefore crucial to our interpretation of (1). In particular, there exists a unique distribution π over states such that c(p) = ∞ whenever p S = π, so that π admits a natural interpretation as the DM's subjective prior over the state space. The function c otherwise satisfies all basic properties demanded of a measure of information: It is (i) non-negative, convex and lower semi-continuous, (ii) equal to zero for product measures with marginal π (i.e., joint distributions which contain no posterior information about states), (iii) depends only on probabilities in the signal dimension, and (iv) satisfies the data processing inequality, a basic monotonicity condition that a measure of information "should" satisfy (Cover and Thomas, 2006, Chapter 2) . We therefore call c an information cost function and, due to the clear parallels with the modeling of attention in Sims (1998 Sims ( , 2003 , call the representation in (1) a utility representation with variable attention.
2 In cognitive psychology, "attention [is] considered a state of mind wherein an individual expects particular information and prepares to perceive and act on that information. ... a resource to be allocated to a particular mental processes [and] paid out on demand to facilitate selected aspects of information processing [or] a process that chooses a particular information for further evaluation and response while ignoring other available information." (Picton et al., 1986, p. 19 ).
Preview of the axioms
The axioms that characterize utility with variable attention are surprisingly simple given the rich information theoretic content of the representation. In addition to standard weak order, monotonicity, continuity and weak independence conditions, the key behavioral postulate is a variable attention (VA) axiom that is related to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty (see Figure 1) . VA is similar to the contemplation aversion axiom in Ergin and Sarver (2010) , although in our domain it has a different interpretation. To motivate, we adapt an example in Ergin and Sarver (2010) to our setting.
Suppose a DM is choosing a restaurant to visit with friends. A state corresponds to the quality of dishes available at each restaurant, an act corresponds to the choice of a dish, and a menu corresponds to the choice of a restaurant. Before meeting with her friends, the DM can review restaurants online, in newspapers and magazines, to obtain information about the quality of dishes. An information processing strategy might correspond to a plan to look at certain webpages, newspaper or magazine articles, and she can actively tailor her strategy to the restaurant under consideration. For example, if her friends suggest Italian food, the DM might research "Italian dining" online, if they suggest Japanese food she might direct attention towards Japanese dining websites. But she will not be able to study all restaurant reviews; even if much of the information is publicly available, she may have insufficient cognitive resources to study them all, or simply have better things to do with her time.
Now suppose with enough effort spent studying reviews first, the DM expects to make an equally good choice at both the Italian and Japanese restaurants. She tells her friends that she is indifferent between the two restaurant options, and they decide to toss a coin. When would the DM like to know the outcome of the coin toss? If a decision over restaurants is made before she spends time on research, she can vary her attention according to the chosen restaurant. She is indifferent between the restaurants, and could reasonably be indifferent with regards to this early randomization. However, if her friends want to toss the coin later, the DM faces a more complex attention allocation problem. To make an equally well-informed choice at both restaurants she must commit more time to research, i.e. pay more attention to available information. As a result, we posit that a DM who intends to actively allocate scarce attention between multiple information sources would prefer the coin to be tossed before she decides how to allocate attention. In fact, the DM might strictly prefer the Italian restaurant over the delayed randomization, because late resolution only complicates her attention allocation problem. VA therefore postulates that a DM indifferent between two menus will at least weakly prefer each menu to a randomization resolved after variable attention has been allocated.
Outline of the paper
We provide additional motivation and discussion of the VA and other axioms in Section 2, after introducing the formal decision model. Section 3 then presents our main results. Theorem 1 gives the axiomatic characterization of the utility representation with variable attention in (1). Proposition 1 shows that mutual information -a measure of information that is commonly employed in applications of rational inattention -is a special case of our cost function. Theorem 2 gives a representation result for a utility function with constrained attention, in which inattention is modeled in terms of an information constraint set (a special case of an information cost function). Proposition 2 shows that the information constraint set can again be defined in terms of mutual information, so that the finite Shannon capacity model -the particular functional form suggested by Sims for rational inattention modeling -is contained as a special case. Theorem 3 incorporates a further restriction on inattention, and characterizes a utility function with fixed attention that formally establishes the link between our model of rational inattention and models of subjective learning. Section 4 provides behavioral criteria for comparative statics on (in)attention. Section 5 discusses related literature and Section 6 concludes. Formal proofs are given in an Appendix.
A Decision Model with Rational Inattention
This section formalizes a decision environment that is suitable for eliciting rational inattention from choice data, and provides a number of behavioral postulates for the preferences of a rationally inattentive agent. The choice domain is formally the same as the one employed by Stoye (2011) to analyze axiomatic foundations of minmax regret decision rules, although the axioms are very different.
Decision environment
Let S be a finite set of states of the world (or simply states), which represent all uncertainty relevant for the payoffs that the DM can receive. The power set of S is denoted 2 S . An element E ∈ 2 S is called an event.
The set Z denotes the set of all possible consequences, and ∆(Z) denotes the set of all simple probability distributions on Z. An element of ∆(Z) is called a lottery. For any two lotteries p,q ∈ ∆(Z) and α ∈ [0, 1], the lottery αp + (1 − α)q assigns probability αp(z) + (1 − α)q(z) to each consequence z ∈ Z. The set of Anscombe-Aumann acts (or simply acts), denoted F, is the set of all functions f : S → ∆(Z). 3 We denote by F C the set of all constant functions f ∈ F for which, in all s ∈ S, f (s) = p for some p ∈ ∆(Z). Mixtures on F are defined pointwise in the usual way: For any f, g ∈ F and α ∈ [0, 1], αf
The alternatives amongst which the DM must choose prior to the realization of a state of the world are finite subsets of F. We denote by M the set of all such finite subsets of F, and call a typical element M ∈ M a menu. For any f ∈ F, {f } denotes the singleton menu that contains only act f . We denote the set of all singleton menus by M S . With a slight abuse of notation, {p} denotes the singleton menu that contains only the constant act p ∈ F C (i.e., the constant act s → p), and M C denotes the set of all constant, singleton menus. The sets M S and M C are in a natural one-to-one relation with the set F and the set ∆(Z), respectively. Finally, for any M, N ∈ M and α ∈ [0, 1], αA + (1 − α)B ∈ M denotes the menu {αf + (1 − α)g ∈ F|f ∈ A and g ∈ B} ∈ M. We observe that with respect to this mixture operation, M is a mixture space.
Axioms
We consider a DM with preferences over menus described by a binary relation on M, and interpret the statement M N to mean that the DM weakly prefers menu M over menu N . Denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of by and ∼, respectively, with the usual interpretations. We now state a collection of axioms to describe preferences of a DM who is a fully rational agent facing a latent, subjective cost of information processing, but who fully anticipates limitations on information processing at the time of expressing preferences over menus.
WO is the standard requirement that preferences be complete and transitive. 4 Our primary behavioral postulate on a weak preference order is directly related to the attention allocation problem of a DM. Recalling the restaurant choice example, a DM may be indifferent between two menus M and N on the basis of quite different plans about how to allocate attention before making an ex-post choice. It seems reasonable to posit that she would be indifferent also to an objective randomization over the menus, as long as randomness is resolved before she allocates attention. But we assume throughout that objective randomization occurs after choices from menus. The late resolution of objective randomization might complicate the attention allocation problem. As such, variable attention states that the DM will at least weakly prefer not to randomize.
and Aumann (1963) , and commonly used in the literature on decision making under uncertainty.
4 Completeness in particular is a strong rationality requirement in a rich choice domain, and it could be interesting to relax the assumption to model a DM who is indecisive about the information she may be able to attend to in the future. We leave this exercise for further research.
As the name suggests, VA allows variable attention, so that attention -viewed as the cognitive resources used to process information about states of the world -can be actively allocated to the most useful information for any given choice problem. Since the attention allocated to information varies with menus, VA is permissive of preference reversals due to any randomization that can complicate the attention allocation problem (i.e., the DM might prefer M to N , but prefer (1/2)N + (1/2)L to (1/2)M +(1/2)L when mixtures of M with L complicate the attention allocation problem more than mixtures of N with L). Our next axiom restricts the scope of such reversals when randomizing with singleton menus, as with a singleton menu there is no ex-post choice to make. As such, randomization with singleton menus complicates the active attention allocation problem of a DM in a restricted way only.
To motivate, a singleton menu could correspond to a restaurant with a strict table d'hôte (i.e., no choice over dishes). Suppose now that a DM and her friends will randomize over anà la carte restaurant and a table d'hôte restaurant. The likelihood of anà la carte restaurant might well influence the attention allocation problem. If there is only a small probability that she ends up at theà la carte restaurant, it may be optimal to allocate very little attention to restaurant reviews at all. If the probability is high, there is much more incentive to try and find pertinent reviews. However, which table d'hôte restaurant is being considered should not affect the allocation of attention. Reviews will not improve the DM's choice at a table d'hôte restaurant, because the menu is fixed, and so her attention should be allocated to find information about theà la carte restaurant. As such, weak singleton independence postulates that for a fixed randomizations with a singleton menu, changing the singleton menu should not lead to preference reversals.
Axiom 3 (Weak Singleton Independence (WSI)) Given M, N ∈ M, f, g ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1), then
To motivate our final behavioral axiom, suppose that the DM and her friends are choosing between an Italian and a Japanese restaurant, both of which have a fish and a meat option. The DM may be uncertain about whether meat or fish dishes are better in general, but if she knows that she prefers the Italian meat over the Japanese meat, and the Italian fish over the Japanese fish, then we posit that she should prefer to go to the Italian restaurant. After all, no matter what information she attends to, or what she would choose at the Japanese restaurant, the Italian restaurant has an option that she prefers. The following monotonicity condition embodies this basic principle.
Axiom 4 (Monotonicity (MON)) Given M, N ∈ M such that for all g ∈ N there exists f ∈ M with {f (s)} {g(s)} for all s ∈ S, then M N .
MON subsumes two standard dominance conditions:
(1) Restricted to singleton menus, MON reflects the usual monotonicity condition invoked in an Anscombe-Aumann settings to obtain state independent payoffs: If {f }, {g} ∈ M S , and {f (s)} ∈ M C is preferred to {g(s)} ∈ M C for all s ∈ S, then MON implies {f } {g}.
(2) MON also clearly implies a "preference for flexibility" (Kreps, 1979) : If M, N ∈ M, and M ⊃ N , then MON implies M N .
Behaviorally, MON therefore assumes that the DM understands fully the state-contingent prizes associated to each act, understands the content of every menu, and is free to choose from menus. However, MON is permissive of inattention to manifest as an attribute of the DM's understanding about the occurrence of external states. In fact, we show in Section 4, that alternative ways of strengthening MON characterize both maximal and minimal inattention, thereby illustrating formally that MON does not restrict the inattention towards external states faced by our DM at all.
Finally, we require two more technical conditions. Both are natural adaptations of axioms in the literature, but they are not falsifiable with finite choice data.
Axiom 5 (Mixture-Continuity (MC)) Given f, g ∈ F and M ∈ M, then the sets {α ∈ [0, 1] :
Axiom 6 (Unboundedness (UB)) There exist p,q ∈ ∆(Z) with {p} {q} such that for all α ∈ (0, 1) there exists r ∈ ∆(Z) satisfying either {q} α{r}
MC adapts the usual mixture-continuity condition employed in Anscombe-Aumann settings to menu choice. Together with WO and MON, its purpose is to guarantee the existence of constant-
is used in a number of "arbitrage" arguments to establish uniqueness properties. It is essentially the condition used by Maccheroni et al. (2006) to identify uniquely a grounded cost function in the representation of variational preferences. We utilize their derivations in our own proofs, but rely more on UB as it also establishes the special role played by the prior π in our representation.
Representation Results
This Section states our main result: A representation theorem for preferences satisfying the axioms of Section 2. We also study a number of special cases of the representation in (1), that provide alternative restrictions on the type of (in)attention exhibited by a DM. Before stating results, we require some notation and definitions.
Preliminaries
Given a discrete product space A × B, we denote by ∆(A × B) the set of probability measures p : 2 A×B → [0, 1], and endow this space with the weak*-topology.
If p ∈ ∆(A × B), p(.|b) denotes the conditional distribution on A given b ∈ B, and defined by
is simply the Bayesian update of the distribution p A on observing b ∈ B, given the dependence between the random experiments A and B when they are governed by the joint probability distribution p. The condition p(.|b) = p A when p B (b) = 0 is simply a convention (it is without loss of generality in the following to assume any arbitrary distribution after conditioning on the observation of an experimental outcome with marginal probability zero). Likewise, p(.|a) denotes the conditional distribution on B given a ∈ A defined by p(
For any joint distribution p ∈ ∆(A×B), there exists a unique product measure, denotedp, associated to p and defined byp(
for all E A ∈ 2 A and E B ∈ 2 B . We denote the set of all product measures on
If p, q ∈ ∆(A × B), p is said to be sufficient for q, denoted p q, if there is a Markov kernel 6 on B × 2 B such that q(E A , E B ) = B K(b,E B )dp(E A , b) for all (E A , E B ) ∈ 2 A × 2 B . If A and B are viewed as two random experiments, the Markov kernel K can be viewed as an ex-post manipulation of the observations from random experiment B. Such manipulations do not provide 5 In the decision theory literature the term probability measure often refers to finitely additive probability measures.
Throughout, we follow the nomenclature in probability theory and reserve the term probability measure for measures that are also countably additive. 6 See Bauer (1995, p. 305) for the definition of a Markov kernel.
additional information about the random experiment A as they depend only on realizations of the experiment B. Blackwell (1953) therefore introduced the ordinal relation on ∆(A×B) to capture the idea that p contains at least as much information as q. 7 We denote the symmetric part of by (i.e., p q if p and q contain equal information).
The sufficiency relation is an ordinal measure of the information that a random experiment B conveys about a random experiment A, when randomness is governed by a particular joint distribution p ∈ ∆(A × B). The information theory literature has also proposed numerous cardinal information measures. Although any non-negative functional on ∆(A × B) could (in principle) serve as an information measure, there are certain properties that a useful information measure should satisfy: (a) It should be equal to zero for product measures (under which the random experiments A and B are independent), (b) it should depend only on the probabilities associated with events in the product space A×B, not on the "names" or "identities" of events, and (c) it should satisfy the monotonicity condition that if p q, then at least as much information should be associate with p as q. Property (c) is often called the data processing inequality, reflecting the idea that post-processing of data should not provide new information (Cover and Thomas, 2006 ).
An especially prominent example of an information measure is mutual information, defined as the relative entropy between p and the product measurep associated with p: 8
As a function on ∆(A × B), mutual information is convex, lower semi-continuous and satisfies properties (a)-(c). Mutual information is only one of many information measures that have been proposed in the information theory literature, but it is the particular information measure that has generally been employed in applications of rational inattention in macroeconomics and finance.
Components of the representation
In our representation, S is a given (i.e., primitive) state space. Σ refers to a countably infinite set which we interpret as a latent signal space, with typical element (or signal ) denoted σ ∈ Σ. As we do not propose to observe how the DM processes information, Σ obtains the meaning of a signal space only once there is a joint distribution on the S × Σ product space. Of course, a joint distribution is not observable either, but our main result shows that a DM satisfying the axioms of Section 2 acts as if she is choosing a joint distribution on S ×Σ, subject to a cost of the information contained in the distribution. The latter is captured by an information cost function.
Definition 1 (Information Cost Function) Given a prior π ∈ ∆(S), we say that a convex, lower-semicontinuous function c :
is an information cost function (relative to π) if c satisfies the following properties:
Convexity, lower-semicontinuity, grounded at null information, and the data processing inequality are central properties for information measures in the information theory literature. As such, an information cost function is an information measure.
There is one important caveat. Measures of information usually depend only on the probabilities of events, and not the "names" or "identities" of events. An information cost function satisfies this condition only in the signal dimension. Property (iii) implies that cost of information depends only on the probabilities associated to elements of Σ (not their identities). This is natural in our setting as Σ is not a primitive of the decision environment. The interpretation of Σ as a signal space comes only from the probabilities associated to its elements. However, the identities of states are crucial, as the state space is the basic primitive reflecting uncertainty about the real world. In our representation theorem, property (i) of an information cost function therefore constrains the DM to choose joint distributions with S-marginals equal to a unique prior π on the state space, reflecting the primitive status of states.
Finally, we require some notation for utility functions on lotteries. Given a function u : Z → R and a lottery p ∈ ∆(Z), denote by
Also, given two functions u 1 , u 2 : Z → R, we sometimes write u 1 ≈ u 2 if there exists α > 0 and β ∈ R such that u 1 = α u 2 + β (i.e., when u 1 and u 2 are equivalent up to positive affine transformations).
A utility representation for variable attention
We are now able to state our main result, a characterization of preferences satisfying the axioms in Section 2.
Theorem 1 Let be a binary relation on M. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) satisfies the WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC and UB axioms.
(ii) There exist a prior π ∈ ∆(S), an unbounded utility index u : Z → R, and an information cost function c :
where for all M ∈ M,
Moreover, if (π 1 , u 1 , c 1 ) and (π 2 , u 2 , c 2 ) represent the same preference relation on M, then π 1 = π 2 and there exists α > 0 and β ∈ R such that u 1 = α u 2 + β and c 1 = α c 2 .
In view of Theorem 1, we call a preference relation on M satisfying axioms WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC and UB, a preference (relation) with variable attention; and we call the representation functional in (6) a (π, u, c)-utility function for variable attention on M.
Proof sketch of Theorem 1. The first step in the sufficiency part of the proof of Theorem 1, is to construct a framework where the objects of choice are simple functions defined on S × Σ. We call these derived objects "superacts", emphasizing both their artificial nature and act like structure. We then derive a preference relation * on superacts through a natural association of superacts with menus. Lemma 1 in the Appendix shows that this derived relation inherits a set of properties once the DM's preferences on M satisfies axioms WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC and UB.
In particular, * satisfies all the properties of a variational preference (Maccheroni et al., 2006) , except that * is ambiguity loving. Adapting Maccheroni et al. (2006) , * can then be represented by a convex niveloid I, that moreover satisfies additional properties derived from the additional structure on * (Lemma 2). Lemma 3 identifies the cost function c and demonstrates its properties from the additional structure on the niveloid I. Finally, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 are used to establish the desired representation. The converse of the result is obtained in a similar fashion as Lemmata 1-3 are characterization results. Details of the proof are given in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 shows that the axioms in Section 2 characterize a DM who acts as if she anticipates choosing joint distributions over S ×Σ, subject to the cost of information contained in distributions. The value of a joint distribution p ∈ ∆(S × Σ) comes only from the DM's ability to use the information contained in the distribution to make better ex-post choices in the menu.
In particular, since c is focused on π (property (i) of an information cost function), the optimization over joint distributions is constrained so that the DM uses her prior π to form ex-ante expectations. This constraint ensures that the DM's prior evaluations are the same for each menu, and varying attention can only improve the choices made ex-post (not the ex-ante value of a particular plan for choices). If the DM was unable to attend to any information about states before choosing from menus, the best she could do is to choose the best act according to her a priori information (captured through π). If, instead, the DM could attend to sufficient information to identify the true state in every case, she could choose the best act in each state in any given menu. However, the DM modeled via (6) lies between these extremes (see Observation 1), and optimally varies attention according to the menus under consideration due to the cost of information c. For a DM with variable attention, the value of a menu M therefore lies somewhere between the expected utility value of the a priori optimal act and the ex-post optimal act in M .
Proof. The proof of Observation 1 is given in the Appendix.
Although we do not characterize specific functional forms for information cost functions, the following proposition establishes that information costs can be measured by mutual information, the measure of information proposed by Sims (1998 Sims ( , 2003 for rational inattention modeling.
, and suppose that for all M ∈ M,
then V * is a utility function with variable attention on M.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the Appendix.
A utility representation for constrained attention
In the background of the utility representation for variable attention is the idea that attention is a scarce resource. A special case corresponds to a purely "physical" constraint on attention.
Recalling the restaurant choice example, suppose that the DM does not have access to the Internet, newspapers or magazines, but that she could instead call a friend to get a recommendation. If calling a friend has no opportunity cost but she does not have time to call more than one friend, she faces a purely "physical" attention allocation problem.
We obtain a special case of the utility representation for variable attention by strengthening the WSI axiom, which in turn represents a further restriction on the types of preference reversals permitted by VA. Suppose, for example, that the DM has one Italian and one Japanese friend. The restaurant options being considered are Italian and Japaneseà la carte restaurants, and a table d'hôte restaurant. With the physical constraint that she can call only one of her two friends, the optimal allocation of attention for a randomization over the Italian and table d'hôte restaurants is not affected by the weight put on the Italian restaurant. No matter how unlikely it is that the Italian restaurant will be drawn, the DM should call her Italian friend for a recommendation. Likewise, in the randomization over the Japanese and table d'hôte restaurants, the DM should call her Japanese friend no matter what weight the objective randomization puts on theà la carte option. More generally, we argue that under purely "physical" constraints on attention, mixtures with singleton menus should not affect the attention allocation problem. The following axiom therefore posits that they should not lead to preference reversals.
Axiom 7 (Singleton Independence (SI)) Given M, N ∈ M, f ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1), then
As the intuition behind the restaurant choice example suggests, strengthening WSI to SI leads to an as if model of an attention allocation problem in which the DM does not face costs of information, but instead optimizes over joint distributions in a constraint set. The following definition formalizes the properties which the resulting constraint set satisfies.
Definition 2 (Information Constraint Set) Given a prior π ∈ ∆(S), we say that a compact convex set Π ⊂ ∆(S × Σ) is an information constraint set (relative to π) if Π satisfies the following conditions:
(ii) Inclusive of null information: {p ∈∆(S × Σ)|p S = π} ⊂ Π, (iii) Data processing monotonicity: p ∈ Π and p q implies q ∈ Π.
Properties (i)-(iii) of an information constraint set are the natural counterparts of properties (i)-(iii) of an information cost function, and have the same interpretation in the current setting. The focus on π restricts the DM to use the same prior to form all ex-ante expectations. The inclusion of null information implies that an attention constraint set is non-empty, because it contains joint distributions under which S and Σ are independent. Data processing monotonicity implies that an information constraint set that contains p also contains any distributions q that contain less information than p. The following representation result characterizes when attention of a preference relation can be captured through an information constraint set.
Theorem 2 Let be a binary relation on M. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
is a preference relation with variable attention that satisfies the SI axiom.
(ii) There exists a prior π ∈ ∆(S), an unbounded utility index u : Z → R, and an information constraint set
where, for all M ∈ M,
Moreover, if (π 1 , u 1 , Π 1 ) and (π 2 , u 2 , Π 2 ) represent the same preference relation on M, then π 1 = π 2 , Π 1 = Π 2 , and u 1 ≈ u 2 .
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2 is given in the Appendix.
It is clear that WSI is redundant in the presence of SI. Hence, in view of Theorem (2), we call a binary relation on M satisfying axioms WO, VA, SI, MON, MC and UB, a preference (relation) with constrained attention; and we call the representation functional in (10) a (π, u, Π)-utility representation with constrained attention on M. Proposition 2 confirms that the attention constraint set can again be defined in terms of mutual information. The resulting model is the finite Shannon capacity functional form first proposed by Sims (1998) for rational inattention modeling.
thenṼ * is a utility function with constrained attention on M.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the Appendix.
Fixed attention and subjective learning
A recent literature studies models of subjective learning (Takeoka, 2005; Lleras, 2010; Dillinberger and Sadowski, 2011) in similar decision environments to the one outlined in Section 2. Subjective learning models study a DM who anticipates receiving subjective information -i.e, information not observable to a decision theorist -before making ex-post choices, and try to capture the behavioral implications of expected information gain. There are noticeable intersections with our decision theoretic model of rational inattention, which we now formalize.
Unlike a rationally inattentive agent, the DM in the subjective learning literature is a passive recipient of information, and is neither able to exert more (or less) effort to learn about states, nor able to actively tailor the information she attends to for the particular menu under consideration. In the context of the restaurant choice example, one could think of a DM who anticipates meeting a particular colleague on the way to a restaurant, anticipates getting information from the colleague that could help in choosing a dish, but does not anticipate being able to actively influence the information that the colleague will reveal to her. In some sense, the DM anticipates learning information that a decision theorist can not observe, but the DM does not in fact face any attention allocation problem.
To clarify the relation between our model of rational inattention and models of subjective learning formally, we provide a further special case of the representations in Theorems 1 and 2. 9 We obtain a model of passive learning simply by strengthening the VA axiom.
Our normative justification for VA was based on the idea that the DM would ideally prefer the resolution of objective randomization before she has actively allocated attention among competing information sources, as late resolution could complicate the attention allocation problem. However, if the DM anticipates being a passive recipient of information (i.e., does not believe that she will be able to actively vary the information that she can attend to), then there is no reason to posit that she might favor early resolution of objective uncertainty (at least not, from the informational viewpoint that justified VA). As such, the following fixed attention axiom states that a DM indifferent between two menus will also be indifferent to any randomization over the menus.
A representation for subjective learning is characterized in the context of our other axioms by strengthening VA to FA.
Theorem 3 Let be a binary relation on M. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) is a preference relation with variable attention that satisfies FA.
(ii) There exist a prior π ∈ ∆(S), an unbounded utility index u : Z → R, and joint distribution p ∈ ∆(S × Σ) with p S = π, such that for all M, N ∈ M:
Moreover, if (π 1 , u 1 , p 1 ) and (π 2 , u 2 , p 2 ) represent the same preference relation on M, then π 1 = π 2 , u 1 ≈ u 2 , and p 1 p 2 .
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3 is given in the Appendix.
In view of Theorem (3), we call a binary relation on M satisfying axioms WO, FA, WSI, MON, MC and UB, a preference (relation) with fixed attention; and we call the representation functional in (13) a (π, u, p)-utility function with fixed attention on M.
The fixed attention model in general allows for a DM to be inattentive to some available information, but the model differs from the variable and constrained attention models by placing further restrictions on the type of (in)attention that the DM can exhibit. The DM now acts as if she anticipates attending to certain information about states before she will choose from menus, but receives this information passively (i.e., is not able to optimize information gain with respect to the particular menu under consideration). It seems clear to us that VA is normatively more compelling than FA, but as a descriptive model, fixed attention provides a behavioral model of subjective learning that identifies the fixed constraint on anticipated information gain from choice data.
The uniqueness properties of the joint distribution p ∈ ∆(S × Σ) are crucial for the behavioral interpretation of the representation of preferences with fixed attention. The joint distribution used by the DM to choose from and evaluate menus in a utility function with fixed attention is distinguished by the prior π over the state space, and the informational content which signals convey about realized states ex-post. As Theorem 3 demonstrates, both are unique. As such, Theorem 3 characterizes when the information that a DM expects to receive about realized states (without any ability to actively tailor the information attended to) can be uniquely identified from choice behavior in our setting; namely, exactly when the DM has preferences with fixed attention.
Comparative Attention
In this Section, we formalize a notion of comparative attention. We first require some notation. Let P denote the set of all preference relations on M with variable attention. 10 For any ∈ P, denote the set of preferences with variable attention that coincide with on singleton menus by P( ) = ∈ P : {f } {g} iff {f } {g} for all f, g ∈ F .
Observation 2 Let 1 , 2 ∈ P be represented by (u 1 , π 1 , c 1 ) and (u 2 , π 2 , c 2 ), respectively. Then the following statements are equivalent.
(i) 1 ∈ P( 2 ).
(ii) 2 ∈ P( 1 ).
(iii) u 1 ≈ u 2 and π 1 = π 2 .
Proof. Observation 2 follows directly from the proof of Theorem 1, and we therefore omit the details.
For two DMs with variable attention, different preferences over menus can arise due to different tastes for prizes (u), different priors (π), or different costs of information (c). Observation 2 demonstrates that if their preferences on singleton menus coincide, their tastes and priors also coincide. We then seek a behavioral criterion to relate their information costs, and thereby to establish observational implications of the (in)attention exhibited by preferences. 11
To motivate, consider two DMs, Ann and Bob, who reveal the same preferences over Bob's greater willingness to dine atà la carte restaurants that he expects to be able to make more informed choices from any menu (i.e., that Bob is more attentive to information than Ann). Our comparative notion of (in)attention formalizes this idea.
Definition 3 (More Attentive) If 1 , 2 ∈ P, we say that 2 is more attentive than 1 if, for all M ∈ M and f ∈ F,
Proposition 3 Let 1 , 2 ∈ P be represented by (π 1 , u 1 , c 1 ) and (π 2 , u 2 , c 2 ), respectively. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
1. 2 is more attentive than 1 .
2. π 1 = π 2 , u 1 ≈ u 2 , and c 1 ≥ c 2 (when u 1 = u 2 ).
Proof. The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 confirms that the behavioral criterion for attentiveness in Definition 3 is characterized in terms of intuitive comparative statics on the costs of information. In particular, if 1 and 2 are represented by (π 1 , u 1 , θ 1 ) and (π 2 , u 2 , θ 2 ), respectively, as in the representation of Proposition 1, then 2 is more attentive than 1 if and only if π 1 = π 2 , u 1 ≈ u 2 , and θ 1 ≥ θ 2 (when u 1 = u 2 ). The same behavioral criterion for (in)attention allows for equally intuitive comparative statics in the constrained and fixed attention models.
Corollary 1 (A) Let 1 , 2 ∈ P be preference relations with constrained attention represented by (π 1 , u 1 , Π 1 ) and (π 2 , u 2 , Π 2 ), respectively. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
2. π 1 = π 2 , u 1 ≈ u 2 , and Π 1 ⊂ Π 2 .
(B) Let 1 , 2 ∈ P be preference relations with fixed attention represented by (π 1 , u 1 , p 1 ) and (π 2 , u 2 , p 2 ), respectively. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
2. π 1 = π 2 , u 1 ≈ u 2 , and p 2 p 1 .
Proof. The proof of Corollary 1 is given in the Appendix.
In particular, if 1 and 2 on M are represented by (π 1 , u 1 , κ 1 ) and (π 2 , u 2 , κ 2 ) as in the representation of Proposition 2, respectively, then 2 is more attentive than 1 if and only if π 1 = π 2 , u 1 ≈ u 2 , and κ 1 ≤ κ 2 .
Based on the comparative notion of (in)attention in Definition 3, we can also define absolute notions of (in)attention to describe, respectively, the behavior of most and least attentive DMs. To this end, we say that a preference relation ∈ P is totally attentive if it is more attentive than every ∈ P( ); and we say that is totally inattentive if every ∈ P( ) is more attentive than . Formally, these notions of absolute (in)attention lead us to the following definition.
Definition 4 (Totally (In)Attentive) A preference relation ∈ P is:
(ii) totally inattentive if, for all ∈ P( ),
Intuitively, in each state of the world, a totally attentive DM is able to observe the true state without costs (i.e., has unlimited attention resources). A totally inattentive DM meanwhile, is not able to attend to any information after the realization of states, and can therefore make ex-post choices based only on her a priori information. These two models represent extremes in terms of the ability to attend to information about states, but both clearly exhibit fixed attention as, for quite different reasons, neither faces any trade-offs in attention allocation. In the following Propositions we characterize both attention extremes in terms of two additional behavioral axioms.
Axiom 9 (Strong Monotonicity (SMON)) Given M, N ∈ M such that for all g ∈ N and s ∈ S there exists f ∈ M satisfying {f (s)} {g(s)}, then M N .
Both SMON and NA can be viewed as monotonicity conditions on preferences. SMON is stronger than MON, as for all g ∈ N if there exists an f ∈ M that is preferred to g in all states, then the premise of SMON is clearly satisfied. It is also easily observed that NA implies MON when combined with the usual monotonicity condition on singleton menus (see p. 9).
To state characterization results for preferences that satisfy SMON or NA, we require some additional notation. For any π ∈ ∆(S), we denote by ∆ π (S × Σ) := {p ∈ ∆(S × Σ) : p S = π} the set of all joint distributions on S × Σ with S-marginal π, and by∆ π := p ∈∆(S × Σ) : p S = π the set of all product distributions on S × Σ with S-marginal π. Finally, for any p ∈ ∆(S × Σ), we denote by Λ(p) = {q ∈ ∆(S × Σ) : p q} the set of all joint distributions on S × Σ for which p is sufficient.
Proposition 4 Let ∈ P be represented by the triple (π, u, c). Then the following statements are equivalent:
is represented by the triple (π, u, Π) with Π = ∆ π (S × Σ).
(v) is represented by the triple (π, u, p) with
(vi) is totally attentive.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 characterizes total attention in terms of SMON; our final result gives the characterization for preferences that are totally inattentive in terms of NA.
Proposition 5 Let ∈ P be represented by the triple (π, u, c). Then the following statements are equivalent:
is represented by the triple (π, u, Π) with Π =∆ π (S × Σ).
(v) is represented by the triple (π, u, p) with Λ(p) =∆ π (S × Σ).
(vi) is totally inattentive.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 5 is given in the Appendix.
Discussion of Related Literature
Part of the motivation for our analysis comes from the many applications of Sims' rational inattention model (see, e.g., Wiederholt, 2010; Veldkamp, 2011 , for a review and references). Mutual information is the standard information measure used in this literature. Although we do not characterize specific functional forms of information cost functions and information constraint sets, Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that the most commonly used objective functions in the rational inattention literature are consistent with the utility functionals we axiomatize. Our results therefore complement the literature applying rational inattention models in macroeconomics and finance by providing behavioral foundations that help to clarify their observational content.
In addition, several strands of the decision theory literature inform our approach. The axioms that we use to characterize rational inattention are closely related to axioms commonly found in the literature on ambiguity aversion on Anscombe-Aumann choice domains, although the interpretation in a menu choice setting is necessarily quite different. For example, the proof for Theorem 1 clearly relates the variable attention model to the variational preferences introduced in Maccheroni et al. (2006) , a model that generalizes maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989 ) in a similar way as variable attention generalizes constrained attention. Maccheroni et al. (2006) offer a game-against-nature interpretation for the variational utility representation, in which the DM acts as if she faces a malevolent nature that, at a cost, chooses distributions over the state space against her. Although our models of rational inattention have related axiomatic foundations, the interpretation offered is quite different. In our models, it is the DM who chooses distributions and faces subjective costs specifically from information processing. The DM is otherwise a subjective expected utility maximizer -the epitome of a Bayesian DM -and deviations from the "standard" rational expectations model come only from limitations on resources for information processing.
It is important for our information-theoretic interpretations that we identify more behavioral primitives and properties of the cost function than Maccheroni et al. (2006) , and we are able to do so by exploiting our richer menu choice domain. Menu choice problems were first proposed by Kreps (1979) to study preference for flexibility. An influential paper in the subsequent literature is Dekel et al. (2001) , who use menus over objective lotteries on a set of prizes to characterize a subjective state space representation. In our domain on menus of acts, the state space is a primitive but the signal space -which is derived from preferences -could be viewed as subjective. However, the interpretation is quite different. The meaning of the state space in the variable attention model comes from the joint distribution chosen by the DM, and depends only on the probabilities of different signals not their identity (by property (iii) of an information cost function). As in the rational inattention approach more generally, it is not necessary to try and interpret the signal space "independently" of some beliefs over it, as Dekel et al. (2001) do in their subjective state space model. The only probability measure that needs to be interpreted independently is the marginal on the primitive state space S, and the uniqueness of π in our representation results assures that we are able to do so.
There are also related menu choice models in which DMs face subjective costs from, inter alia, self-control problems (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001) or thinking aversion (Ortoleva, 2012) . A driving assumption in many of these models is that DMs may sometimes strictly prefer a subset of a menu (unlike in Kreps, 1979) . Ortoleva (2012) , for example, studies a DM who incurs costs from thinking about the content of a menu, and may therefore prefer a smaller menu to a larger one that contains it. Masatlioglu et al. (2012) also consider a DM who reveals potentially limited attention about items in a menu. Thinking aversion and the revealed inattention in Masatlioglu et al. (2012) differ, however, from the type of inattention we study because a DM with variable attention fully understands the content of each menu, and rather faces costs from processing information about an external state space that is independent of menus. A strict preference for subsets therefore does not make sense in our setting -or, at least, does not follow from the type of inattention we are interested in -and it is straightforward to verify that our monotonicity axiom contradicts such preference patterns.
The closest work to ours in the menu choice literature is Ergin and Sarver (2010) , who extend on Dekel et al. (2001) to analyze a decision model with costly contemplation. In the costly contemplation model, the DM has uncertainty about future tastes (e.g., parameters of risk-aversion) and, at a subjective cost, can exert contemplation to better understand her tastes before choosing from the menu. The domain of preferences in their analysis is menus of objective lotteries, and therefore differs from ours. But the axioms that characterize costly contemplation behaviorally are very similar to ours. In particular, our variable attention axiom is the natural counterpart of their contemplation aversion axiom in a richer choice setting. However, the translation of their axioms into a menu-of-acts domain leads to new insights. A DM with variable attention understands her tastes, and uncertainty about external states remains only due to limitations on her information processing. Our representation is therefore closer to applied work in information economics, as testified by the large pre-existing literature in which rational inattention has been successfully used to explain diverse phenomena from price stickiness (e.g., Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009 ) and business cycle fluctuations (e.g., Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2010) , to the home-bias in international portfolio decisions (e.g., Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009 ).
Finally, the decision models we study could be placed in the context of the large literature on bounded rationality more generally, although that label seems misleading to us. To be sure, rational inattention is a deviation from the rational expectations framework, where an agent is assumed to internalize all publicly available information without effort. But the manner in which information processing is treated under rational expectations seem like an unreasonably high bar to place on rationality. As cognitive psychologists have long recognized, attention can be viewed as a scarce resource, and optimal allocation of attention could then be viewed a classic resource allocation problem. A central contribution of Sims (1998 Sims ( , 2003 was to draw this resource allocation problem to the attention (no pun intended) of the economic profession, and propose a tractable framework to integrate attention allocation into larger economic models. A growing literature attests to the value of his proposed approach, but we believe that the study of inattention also falls in the purview of decision theory as the allocation of attention -unlike many other valuable resources -often occurs in private, behind closed doors, rather than in markets or other public forums. Firmly in the spirit of Sims' approach, we nevertheless regard attention as the allocation of a scarce resource by an optimizing agent, and therefore hold that as a model of behavior our findings affirm that rational inattention has both descriptive and normative appeal.
Conclusion
The objective functions used in economic models are chosen to capture pertinent behavioral attributes of agents in a tractable way. Rational inattention is a case in point. The assumption that an agent chooses a joint distribution over states and signals omits many details of attention and information processing, but has proven tractable enough to successfully embed attention allocation problems in larger economic models. In order to remain empirically founded it is also important, however, to understand what the falsifiable implications of a decision rule are. The objects of choice in the rational inattention approach (i.e., joint distributions) make this task appear challenging.
In this paper, we allay concerns over the observational foundations of rational inattention models by identifying a choice domain and a set of falsifiable axioms that characterize rationally inattentive behavior. A DM who obeys our axioms acts as if she anticipates choosing joint distributions over states and signals subject to costs of information, as in much of the applied literature on rational inattention. The attention allocation problem proposed by Sims (1998 Sims ( , 2003 therefore attains the same standing in our framework as the prior in the classic subjective expected utility model of Savage (1954) , itself not observable but inferable from observable choice data.
As a large literature attests, rational inattention appears to have much to offer for economic research in the age of information. By clarifying some of the decision theoretic underpinnings of rational inattention, our results therefore add to a deeper understanding of an important approach to model limitations on people's ability to attend to the abundance of available information.
A Appendix

A.1 Preliminaries
We first introduce some notation and definitions extending on Maccheroni et al. (2006) .
For any finite set S and countably infinite set Σ, let B 0 (S ×Σ) be the set of all simple functions ϕ : S ×Σ → R, and B(S × Σ) its supnorm closure consisting of all bounded functions ψ : S × Σ → R. B 0 (S × Σ, T ) denotes the set of all functions in B 0 (S × Σ) taking values in the interval T ⊂ R. Endowed with the supnorm, B 0 (S × Σ) is a normed vector space and its norm dual ba(S × Σ) is endowed with the total variation norm. As a consequence of duality, the space of all probability measures ∆(S × Σ) can be endowed with the weak* topology where a net
S×Σ (see, e.g., the opening remarks in the Appendix of Maccheroni et al., 2006) .
For ϕ, ψ ∈ B(S × Σ), we write ϕ ≥ ψ if ϕ(s, σ) ≥ ψ(s, σ) for all (s, σ) ∈ S × Σ, and we write ϕ ≥ Σ ψ if for all σ ∈ Σ there exists σ ∈ Σ such that ϕ(s, σ ) ≥ ψ(s, σ) for all s ∈ S. Let Φ be any non-empty, convex collection of elements of B(S × Σ), Φ c the subset of constant functions in Φ, and Φ S the subset of functions in Φ that are measurable with respect to the algebra 2 S × Σ. Given a functional I : Φ → R, we say that I is:
(ii) monotonic if ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ and ϕ ≥ ψ implies I(ϕ) ≥ I(ψ);
(iii) Σ-monotonic if ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ and ϕ ≥ Σ ψ implies I(ϕ) ≥ I(ψ);
Remark 1 LetĪ : −Φ → R be defined byĪ(ϕ) := −I(−ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ −Φ. ThenĪ is normalized iff I is normalized;Ī is monotonic iff I is monotonic;Ī is Σ-monotonic iff I is Σ-monotonic;Ī is singleton-additive iff I is singleton-additive;Ī is a niveloid iff I is a niveloid;Ī is concave iff I is convex.
A.2 "Superacts"
Let K 0 denote the set of all simple functions K : S × Σ → ∆(Z). We refer to elements of K 0 as superacts.
Denote by K c the set of all K p ∈ K 0 -called constant superacts -for which there exists a p ∈ ∆(Z) such that K p (s, σ) = p for all (s, σ) ∈ S × Σ. Denote by K S the set of all K f ∈ K 0 -called singleton superacts -for which there exists an act f ∈ F such that K f (., σ) = f for all σ ∈ Σ. With some abuse of notation, we denote by K(s, σ) ∈ K 0 the super act that takes value K(s, σ) ∈ ∆(Z) for all (s , σ ) ∈ S × Σ. For all K, K ∈ K 0 and α ∈ [0, 1], αK + (1 − α)K is the superactK ∈ K 0 defined byK(s, σ) := αK(s, σ) + (1 − α)K (s, σ) for all (s, σ) ∈ S × Σ. Note that with respect to this mixture operation, the set K 0 is a mixture space.
In the sequel, we will refer to the following properties of a binary relation on K 0 . To this end, associate in the usual sense, with its symmetric and asymmetric parts denoted ∼ and , respectively.
• Weak Order (WO*):
• Ambiguity Affection (AA*):
• Weak Constant-Singleton Independence (WCSI*):
• Weak Singleton Independence (WSI*):
• Singleton Independence (SI*):
• Monotonicity (MON*):
• Σ-Monotonicity (ΣMON*): If K, K ∈ K 0 such that for all σ ∈ Σ, there exists some σ ∈ Σ with K(s, σ ) K (s, σ) for all s ∈ S, then K K .
• Mixture-Continuity (MC*):
• Unboundedness (UB*): There exist K p , K q ∈ K c with K p K q such that for all α ∈ (0, 1) there exists K r ∈ K c satisfying either
A.2.1 Properties of a derived relation on superacts
The focus of this Section is a Lemma that characterizes properties of a derived binary relation on K 0 . Before stating the result, we require some additional notation and definitions.
Let {σ 1 , σ 2 , ...} be an enumeration of the set Σ, and for any M = {f 1 , ..., f T M } ∈ M, define K M ∈ K 0 as follows:
In all of the following, the specific enumerations chosen for M and Σ do not matter.
Define the operator m :
as for each σ ∈ Σ K(., σ) ∈ F and the range of K is finite.
Let be a given binary relation on M. Define a binary relation * on K 0 using the operator m by way of the following definition: For all K, K ∈ K 0 ,
The following Lemma characterizes some properties that * can inherit from .
Lemma 1 Let be a binary relation on M and define * on K 0 by way of (18) 
and so by WO it follows that m(K) m(K ) so that * is transitive. Hence * is a weak order.
(AA*): Let K, K ∈ K 0 and α ∈ [0, 1]. By MON and Remark 2 it follows that αm(K)
Then by WSI and Remark 2,
and so αK
(ΣMON*): Let K, K ∈ K 0 , and suppose that for all σ ∈ Σ there exists σ ∈ Σ such that K(s, σ ) * K (s, σ) for all s ∈ S. Let g ∈ m(K ). Then there exists some σ ∈ Σ such that g = K (., σ) and so there exists some σ ∈ Σ such that K(s, σ )
for all s ∈ S. By MON it follows that m(K) m(K ) and so * satisfies ΣMON*. Moreover, since ΣMON* implies MON*, * also satisfies MON*.
(MC*): Let K f , K g ∈ K S and K ∈ K 0 . Then by Remark 2,
and
Since satisfies MC all of the above sets are closed, and it follows that * satisfies MC*.
(UB*): By UB, there exists p, q ∈ ∆(Z) with {p} {q} such that for all α ∈ (0, 1) there exists r ∈ ∆(Z) satisfying either {q} α{r} + (1 − α){p} or α{r} + (1 − α){q} {p}. By the natural identification of K c ⊂ K 0 with ∆(Z), * therefore satisfies UB* as m(K p ) = {p} by Remark 2.
Finally, suppose satisfies SI.
(SI*): Let K, K ∈ K 0 , f ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1). Then by SI and Remark 2,
To show the converse, let * satisfy WO*, AA*, WSI*, ΣMON*, MC*, and UB*.
(WO): Let M, N ∈ M. By WO* and Remark 2,
and so by WO*,
Hence, is a weak order.
Let K ∈ K 0 be defined as follows:
(WSI): Let M, N ∈ M, f, g ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1). By WSI*,
and so by Remark 2, satisfies WSI.
(MON): Let M, N ∈ M and suppose that for all g ∈ N there exists f ∈ M such that {f (s)} {g(s)} for all s ∈ S. Then for all σ ∈ Σ, there exists some σ ∈ Σ such that K M (., σ ) * K N (., σ). By ΣMON*, K M * K N and so M N and satisfies MON.
(MC): Let f, g ∈ F and M ∈ M. By Remark 2,
By MC*, all of the above sets are closed, and so satisfies MC.
(UB):. By UB* there exists p, q ∈ ∆(Z) with K p * K q such that for all α ∈ (0, 1) there exists r ∈ ∆(Z)
Finally, suppose * satisfies SI*. 
A.2.2 A representation for the binary relation on superacts
For any function u : Z → R, let cl(u) denote the convex closure of u(Z) := {u ∈ R|u = u(z) for some z ∈ Z}. For any K ∈ K 0 , we use the notation Maccheroni et al. (2006, Lemma 28) establish the following Remark.
The following Lemma gives a first representation result for the binary relation * on superacts.
Lemma 2 Let * be a binary relation on K 0 . The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) * satisfies WO*, AA*, WSI*, ΣMON*, MC*, and UB*.
(ii) There exists an unbounded function u : Z → R and a normalized, Σ-monotonic, singleton-additive, convex niveloid I :
Moreover, there exists a unique π ∈ ∆(S) such that I(Eu
for all f ∈ F, and u is unique up to positive affine transformations.
Proof. To show (i) implies (ii), let * satisfy WO*, AA*, WSI*, ΣMON*, MC*, and UB*. We proceed in several steps.
Step 1: Existence of u : Z → R and a normalized, Σ-monotonic niveloid I representing * .
For any K ∈ K 0 , let b K be the * -maximal element of the range of K, and w K be the * -minimal
It then follows exactly as in the proof of Lemma 28 in Maccheroni et al. (2006) , that there exists a non-constant function u : Z → R and a normalized niveloid I :
Moreover, the function u is unique up to positive affine transformations, and by Lemma 29 in Maccheroni et al. (2006) u is unbounded. In addition, it is easily verified that ΣMON* implies that I is Σ-monotonic.
Step 2: Convexity of I.
LetĪ : B 0 (S × Σ, −cl(u)) → R be defined byĪ(ϕ) = −I(−ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ B 0 (S × Σ, −cl(u)). By Remark 1,Ī is a normalized niveloid. Also, it is easy to verify that for any ϕ, ψ ∈ B 0 (S × Σ, −cl(u)) such that I(ϕ) =Ī(ψ) and α ∈ [0, 1],Ī(αϕ + (1 − α)ψ) ≥Ī(ϕ) by (29). Thus Lemma 25 in Maccheroni et al. (2006) guarantees thatĪ is concave, and by Remark 1 I must be convex.
Step 3: Existence of π ∈ ∆(S) such that I(Eu
Let be a binary relation on F defined by:
and associate with it the asymmetric part and symmetric part ∼ in the usual sense. It is easy to verify that satisfies counterparts of WO*, WSI*, MC* and UB* (denoted WO', WSI', MC' and UB'), and that it satisfies the property MON': If f (s) g(s) for all s ∈ S, then f g.
We now show that also satisfies I': For all f, g ∈ F, f g iff αf + (1 − α)h αg + (1 − α)h for all h ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1).
Let f, g ∈ F such that f ∼ g. Suppose for contradiction, without loss of generality, that there exists some h ∈ F such that (1/2)f + (1/2)h (1/2)g + (1/2)h. Then, by WSI', f (1/2)g + (1/2)f and similarly (1/2)g + (1/2)f g, implying that f g, a contradiction. Therefore, for any h ∈ F, we must have (1/2)f + (1/2)h ∼ (1/2)g + (1/2)h. Thus, together with properties WO', MON', MC' and UB', all three postulates in Herstein and Milnor (1953) are satisfied, and so by their Theorems 2 and 3, satisfies I'. It then follows from a standard result (see, e.g., Fishburn, 1970; Kreps, 1988, pp. 176-177, pp.99-111 ) that there exist a unique probability measure π ∈ ∆(S) and a non-constant function v : Z → R, unique up to positive affine transformations, such that for all f, g ∈ F,
Since I is normalized, by (28), (30), (31) and the uniqueness properties of v and u it is without loss of generality to assume v = u (hence, v is also unbounded). Thus for all f, g ∈ K S ,
Moreover, by (28), (30) and (32),
Step 4: Singleton-additivity of I.
To complete the proof that (i) implies (ii) we now show that WSI* also implies that I is singletonadditive. Since u is unbounded and unique only up to positive affine transformations, assume w.l.o.g that 0 ∈ int (u(Z)). Now let K ∈ K 0 , f ∈ F, and α ∈ [0, 1], and note that
] for all (s, σ) ∈ S × Σ. By monotonicity of I, it follows that
and so by (33),
Hence, there exists some β ∈ [0, 1] such that (28), (33), and (36), αKp
, and hence
Hence,
and so I is singleton-additive.
Steps 1 -4 complete the proof that (i) implies (ii), and establish the existence of π ∈ ∆(S) by Step 3.
To prove that (ii) implies (i), let u : Z → R be an unbounded function, and I : B 0 (S × Σ, cl(u)) → R be a normalized, Σ-monotone, singleton-additive, convex niveloid that represents * in the sense of (28).
Lemmas 28 and 29 in Maccheroni et al. (2006) shows that * satisfies WO*, MC*, UB*, ΣMON*, and WSCI*. Property ΣMON* follows directly from Σ-monotonicity of I, and property AA* follows directly from convexity of I. It therefore remains to show that * satisfies WSI*. Let K, K ∈ K 0 , f, g ∈ F and
showing that * satisfies WSI*, and also completing the proof that (ii) implies (i). Since, (i) and (ii) are equivalent, Step 3 in the proof that (i) implies (ii) establishes the existence of π ∈ ∆(S) such that
The following Lemma is a central step in identifying the information cost function in Theorem 1. Here, ∆ * (S × Σ) refers to the set of all finitely additive probability measures on 2 S×Σ , a set which clearly contains
Lemma 3 Let u : Z → R be an unbounded function with 0 ∈ int cl(u), and I be a real-valued functional on B 0 (S × Σ, cl(u)). Then (in view of Remark 3) the following statements are equivalent.
(i) The functional I is a normalized, Σ-monotonic, singleton-additive, convex niveloid.
(ii) For all K ∈ K 0 , the functional I satisfies
where c * :
is the unique grounded, convex, weak* lower-semicontinuous function satisfying (40) and
Moreover, in this case c * (p) also satisfies the following three properties: −cl(u) ). By Remark 1,Ī is a concave and normalized niveloid. Thus, by Lemma 26 in Maccheroni et al. (2006) ,Ī satisfies
wherec(p) is a non-negative, grounded, convex, and weak* lower semi-continuous function defined on ∆ * (S × Σ). Since u is an unbounded function, then again by Lemma 26 in Maccheroni et al. (2006) ,
is the unique non-negative, grounded, convex and weak* lower semi-continuous function satisfying (42).
Thus, by using the definition ofĪ and (42), for all Eu
where, by the definition ofĪ and (43),
is the unique non-negative, grounded, convex and weak* lower semi-continuous function defined on ∆ * (S ×Σ) satisfying (44). Now let K ∈ K 0 and observe that, for all p ∈ ∆ * (S × Σ),
Thus by (44) and (46), we have
Let
It is clear that
, and so by (47),
, and so by Σ-monotonicity of I, we must
Next, we verify the properties (a) -(d) of the function c * . Note that since I : B 0 (S × Σ, cl(u)) → R is a normalized niveloid which is Σ-monotone and singleton-additive, by Lemma 2 there exists a unique π ∈ ∆(S) such that I(Eu
First consider the case of u unbounded above and let p ∈ ∆ * (S × Σ) such that p S = π. Then there exists s ∈ S such that p S (s) > π(s). For such an s ∈ S, letK S := {K f ∈ K S : Eu[f (s)] = a for all s ∈ S\{s}} for some fixed a ∈ cl(u). Then by (45) and the fact that I(Eu
A similar argument shows that when u is unbounded below, c * (p) = ∞, and so we conclude that c * (p) satisfies property (a).
To show that c * satisfies property (b), let p, q ∈ ∆(S × Σ) such that p q. Let K ∈ K 0 and define
such that for all σ ∈ Σ,
Then it is clear that
Moreover, by construction of the superact K p , K ≥ Σ K p and so by Σ-monotonicity of I, I(Eu
. Combining these two inequalities,
From the last inequality, it follows that
and hence c * satisfies property (b).
To show that c * satisfies property (c), let p Σ ∈ ∆ * (Σ). Since I is Σ-monotonic, for any
and in particular,
if K = K f for some f ∈ F. Hence, by (45) and non-negativity of c * , we have c * (π × p Σ ) = 0, and so property (c) is satisfied.
Finally, we verify that c * also satisfies property (d). To see this, note that for any sequence of sets E 1 , E 2 , .... ∈ 2 S×Σ such that E 1 ⊃ E 2 ⊃ ..., and n≥1 E n = ∅, there exists some N ∈ N such that n ≥ N implies E n = ∅. Hence, by Proposition 29 and Theorem 11 in Maccheroni et al. (2004) , and the unboundedness of u, {p ∈ ∆ * (S × Σ)|c * (p) ≤ t} is a weak* compact subset of ∆(S × Σ) for all t ≥ 0. Therefore c * satisfies
property (d), and this concludes the proof that (i) implies (ii).
For the converse, let I be a real-valued functional on B 0 (S × Σ, cl(u)), defined for all K ∈ K 0 by
for some grounded, convex, weak* lower semi-continuous function c :
We first show that I is a niveloid. Note that since c(.) is grounded, by (56), I(Eu
where J(m(K), p) is defined as in (46) and thus, by (56),
, and α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, we have αK + (1 − α)K p ∈ K 0 and, by (46),
Since 0 ∈ int cl(u) and I satisfies monotonicity and (58), by Lemma 25 in Maccheroni et al. (2006) , I is a niveloid.
To show that I is convex, let K, K ∈ K 0 and α ∈ [0, 1]. Then by (56),
as desired.
Since I is a convex, normalized niveloid and u is unbounded, by the observations on (42)- (45) and Lemma 25 in Maccheroni et al. (2006) we deduce that c must be equal to the function c * defined in (45), and conclude that c is the unique function satisfying (56).
Next, we verify that I is also singleton-additive. First, let f ∈ F and note that
Now let K ∈ K 0 , f ∈ F and α ∈ [0, 1]. By (46), (56), and (60),
Finally, to show that I is Σ-monotone, let K,
for all σ ∈ Σ. Hence, for all p ∈ ∆ * (S × Σ)
and so by (46) and (56)
showing that I is Σ-monotone. This completes the proof.
A.3 Proofs of results in the paper
Proof of Theorem 1.
Let be a given binary relation on M and define a binary relation * on K 0 by way of (18).
(i) implies (ii): Suppose that satisfies the WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC, and UB axioms. Then by Lemma 1, * satisfies WO*, AA*, WSI*, ΣMON*, MC* and UB*. Thus, by Lemma 2 there exists an unbounded function u : Z → R, a prior π ∈ ∆(S) and a normalized, Σ-monotonic, singleton additive, convex niveloid
and for all f ∈ F, I(Eu
, and it is w.l.o.g to let 0 ∈ int (u(Z)).
By Lemma 3, there exists an information cost function c * :
Define V (M ) := I(Eu • K M ) for all M ∈ M, then by (18) and (64), V is a representation of on M. Application of the law of iterated expectations gives the desired representation in Theorem 1, and the uniqueness properties of u, π and c * follow from Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
(ii) implies (i): Let u : Z → R be an unbounded utility index with 0 ∈ int (u(Z)), and c :
be an information cost function relative to some π ∈ ∆(S), such that the function V : M → R defined for all M ∈ M as
represents the binary relation on M. Define the function I :
. Then I satisfies all the premises of Lemma 3 (ii), and so by Lemma 3 I is a normalized, Σ-monotonic, singleton-additive and convex niveloid on Eu • K 0 . Moreover, since V represents , by definition of the binary relation * , I represents * on K 0 . Thus, by Lemma 2, * must satisfy properties WO*, AA*, WSI*, ΣMON*, MC* and UB* on K 0 . This implies that satisfies properties WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC and UB on M by Lemma 1.
Proof of Observation 1. Define for each M ∈ M an oracle act of M by, for all s ∈ S O M (s) = f (s) for some f ∈ M such that {f (s)} {g(s)} for all g ∈ M.
(67)
The observation follows directly as (i) V represents , (ii) satisfies MON, (iii) MON implies that for all M ∈ M, M {f } if f ∈ M , and (iv) MON implies that {O M } M .
Proof of Proposition 1. For all M ∈ M, the function V * satisfies
Eu[f (s)]dp(s|σ) dp(σ|s) dp(s) −c(p) ,
Since mutual information is a non-negative, weak* lower-semicontinuous, convex function on ∆(S × Σ), c is clearly non-negative, weak* lower-semicontinuous and convex. We now verify thatc also satisfies all three other properties of an information cost function. By definition ofc, property (i) is satisfied and since M I(p) = 0 when p ∈∆(S × Σ),c also satisfies property (ii).
It remains to show thatc also satisfies property (iii). Let p, q ∈ ∆(S × Σ) such that p q. Then there must
Hence q and p must satisfy,
Thus if p S (s) = π, thenc(p) =c(q) = ∞, and soc(p) ≥c(q). Now assume that p S (s) = π. Then, since mutual information satisfies the data processing inequality (Cover and Thomas, 2006 , Chapter 2), M I(p) ≥ M I(q) and soc(p) ≥c(q).
Proof of Theorem 2.
The proof of (i) implies (ii) follows closely Theorem 1, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989, Theorem 1) and Maccheroni et al. (2006, Proposition 19) . We provide an outline of the basic steps below, omitting details that would be obvious.
Let be a binary relation on M satisfying WO, VA, SI, MON, MC and UB, and define * on K 0 by way of (18). Then by Lemma 1, * satisfies WO*, AA*, SI*, ΣMON*, MC* and UB*. Moreover, as in the proof of Theorem 1, each K ∈ K 0 admits a constant-singleton equivalent p K by MC*, and the preference relation * is represented by a convex functional I. It then follows as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989, Theorem 1, substituting sublinear for superlinear in the obvious way) and Lemma 29 in Maccheroni et al. (2006) that there exists an unbounded u : Z → R, and a weak*-compact, convex set Π ⊂ ∆(S × Σ) such
Moreover, Π is unique and u is unique up to positive linear transformations.
Also, since SI* implies WSI*, there exist a unique π ∈ ∆(S × Σ) and an information cost function c * : 
By properties (a)-(d) of c * in Theorem 1, we have:
Hence, the set {p ∈ ∆(S × Σ)|c * (p ) = 0} is an information constraint set. Following the steps of Lemma 3 and the proof of (i) implies (ii) for Theorem 1, one concludes the sufficiency part of the proof.
To prove that (ii) implies (i), observe thatṼ is clearly a special case of V in Theorem 1, and hence satisfies WO, VA, WSI, MON, MC and UB. It remains to show that also satisfies SI. Let α ∈ (0, 1), M ∈ M, and g ∈ F, then
Eu[f (s)]dp(s|σ) dp Σ (σ)
]dp(s|σ) dp Σ (σ)
Eu[h(s)]dp(s|σ) dp
Hence,Ṽ (αM + (1 − α){g}) = αṼ (M ) + (1 − α)Ṽ (g), and so clearly satisfies SI.
so we only need to show thatΠ is an information constraint set.
To see this, note that the mutual information functional M I(.) is weak* lower semicontinuous in p ∈ ∆(S ×Σ) and so, for any κ ≥ 0, the set {p ∈ ∆(S × Σ)|M I(p) ≤ κ} is weak* closed, and is therefore weak* compact. If, on the other hand, κ = ∞, then {p ∈ ∆(S × Σ)|M I(p) ≤ κ} = ∆(S × Σ), which is weak* compact. Also note that the set ∆ π (S × Σ) is weak* closed in ∆(S × Σ). Thus,Π is a weak* closed subset of the set {p ∈ ∆(S × Σ)|M I(p) ≤ κ}, and henceΠ is weak* compact.
Next, we show thatΠ is convex. Let p, p ∈Π and α ∈ [0, 1]. Then the probability measure q = αp+(1−α)p ∈ ∆ π (S × Σ). Moreover, by convexity of the mutual information functional,
showing that q ∈Π.
Since M I(p) = 0 for any p ∈∆(S × Σ), the set∆(S × Σ) ∩ ∆ π (S × Σ) is a subset ofΠ, showing thatΠ satisfies property (i) of an information constraint set. Also note that by definition ofΠ, property (ii) is clearly satisfied.
Hence, for all M ∈ M, we can write V (M ) = max p∈Π J(M, p), where the function J(., .) is defined in (46). Let Π(M ) = arg max p∈Π J(M, p) for every M ∈ M. Since Π is compact and J is continuous in p, Π(M )
is non-empty and closed. Moreover, if M, N ∈ M such that there exist some α > 0 and β ∈ R satisfying
We claim that M ∈M Π(M ) = ∅ for any finite M ⊂ M. That is, the collection of sets {Π(M ) ⊂ Π : M ∈ M} satisfies the finite intersection property. To see this, let M be a finite subset of M and, in view of the preceding remark, assume w.l.o.g that M ∼ N for all M, N ∈ M . Enumerate the finite set M = {M 1 , .., M n } for some n ≥ 1. If n = 1, then claim holds trivially. Assume, therefore, that n ≥ 2. Let α i ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} such that ( n i=1 α i ) = 1, and define M = ( n i=1 α i M i ). Since M i ∼ M j for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, by repeated application of FA, it follows that M ∼ M i for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. Thus, for any p ∈ Π(M ),
showing that J(M i , p) = V (M i ) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and so p ∈ M ∈M Π(M ), establishing the claim.
Since Π is compact and the set {Π(M ) ⊂ Π : M ∈ M} is a collection of closed sets in Π which satisfies the finite intersection property, it follows that M ∈M Π(M ) = ∅ (see, e.g., Munkres, 1975, Theorem 5.9, p. 170) . That is, there exists some p ∈ Π such that V (M ) = J(M, p) for all M ∈ M, showing that (ii) holds.
Moreover, if q ∈ Π is another joint distribution such that J(M, q) = V (M ) for all M ∈ M, then p and q must be "equally informative " Gollier (2004, Lemma 9 and Proposition 87, pp. 362-366) . Thus, by Blackwell (1953) 's equivalence result, p q (see Kihlstrom, 1984 , Theorems 1-6, pp. 18-23).
(ii) implies (i): Let be a binary relation on M represented by the functionV : M → R given in (13). It is readily seen thatV is a (π, u, c)-variable attention utility function, and so is a variable attention preference relation by Theorem 1. Moreover, sinceV (M ) is a linear functional on M, satisfies FA, and thus (i) holds.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let 1 , 2 be preferences with variable attention on M represented by (u 1 , π 1 , c 1 ) and (u 2 , π 2 , c 2 ), respectively.
Suppose that 2 is more attentive than 1 . By (14), for all p, q ∈ ∆(Z), {p} ∼ 1 {q} implies {p} ∼ 2 {q}. We claim that we must also have {p} 1 {q} implies {p} 2 {q} for all p, q ∈ ∆(Z), and hence that u 1 ≈ u 2 . Assume for contradiction that there exist some p, q ∈ ∆(Z) such that {p} 1 {q} and {p} ∼ 2 {q}. Since u 2 is non-constant, there exists some r ∈ ∆(Z) such that either {r} 2 {p} or {q} 2 {r}. Assume w.l.o.g that the former is true. By (14) , it follows that {r} 1 {p} and so by MC, there exists some α ∈ (0, 1) such that α{r} + (1 − α){q} ∼ 1 {p}. Then again by (14), it must follow that α{r} + (1 − α){q} ∼ 2 {p} ∼ 2 {q}. Since Eu 2 is affine on ∆(Z), it follows that 
showing that Eu 2 [r] = Eu 2 [q] and so {r} ∼ 2 {q}, a contradiction. This proves the claim.
We now show that π 1 = π 2 . Assume for contradiction that this is not true. Then there must exists some s ∈ S such that π 1 (s) = π 2 (s). Also, since u 1 is non-constant, there exist some q, r ∈ ∆(Z) such that {q} 1 {r}. Let f ∈ F such that f (s) = q and f (s ) = r for all s ∈ S\{s} and let p f ∈ ∆(Z) such that {p f } ∼ 1 {f }. 
Combining (81) and (82) By the preceding arguments, it follows that π 1 = π 2 = π and u 1 ≈ u 2 , so it is w.l.o.g to set u 1 = u 2 = u. Denote the niveloids corresponding to the representations of 1 and 2 on K 0 in Lemma 3 by I 1 and I 2 , respectively. By the supposition, if M ∼ 1 {f } for some M, {f } ∈ M, then M 2 {f }, and therefore
and so I 1 ≤ I 2 . Hence,
for all p ∈ ∆(S × Σ), proving that (1.) implies (2.).
To prove the converse, suppose that π 1 = π 2 = π, u 1 = u 2 = u, and c 1 ≥ c 2 . Let M, {f } ∈ M such that M 1 {f }. Then by Theorem 1, max p∈∆(S×Σ)
But since c 2 ≤ c 1 , we have max p∈∆(S×Σ)
and so M 2 {f } showing that (2.) implies (1.).
Proof of Corollary 1. By Proposition 3, 2 is more attentive than 1 iff π 1 = π 2 = π, u 1 ≈ u 2 , and c 1 ≥ c 2 when u 1 = u 2 .
(A) Let 1 , 2 be preferences with constrained attention on M represented by (u 1 , π 1 , Π 1 ) and (u 2 , π 2 , Π 2 ), respectively. By the proof of Theorem 2, Π i = {p ∈ ∆(S × Σ)|c i (p) = 0} where c i : ∆(S × Σ) → {0, ∞}, for constrained attention preferences i , where i = 1, 2. Hence, setting π 1 = π 2 = π and u 1 = u 2 = u, we have 2 is more attentive than 1 iff c 1 (p) = 0 implies c 2 (p) = 0, equivalently Π 1 ⊂ Π 2 .
(B) Let 1 and 2 be preference relations with fixed attention on M, represented by (π 1 , u 1 , p 1 ) and (π 2 , u 2 , p 2 ), respectively. By the proof of Theorem 3, Λ(p i ) = {p ∈ ∆(S ×Σ)|c i (p) = 0} where c i : ∆(S ×Σ) → {0, ∞}, for fixed attention preferences i , where i = 1, 2. Hence, setting π 1 = π 2 = π and u 1 = u 2 = u, we have 2 is more attentive than 1 iff c 1 (p) = 0 implies c 2 (p) = 0, equivalently Λ(p 1 ) ⊂ Λ(p 2 ) or p 2 p 1 .
Proof of Proposition 4. In view of the preceding results, it is readily seen that
We complete the proof by showing that (i) ⇒ (ii) ⇒ (iii).
First, suppose that (i) holds. Let be preference relation with variable attention which satisfies SMON. For any menu M ∈ M, observe that by (67) for every f ∈ M and every s ∈ S, {O M (s)} {f (s)} and thus {O M } M by SMON. Similary, by (67) for every s ∈ S there exists some f ∈ M such that {f (s)} ∼ {O M (s)} and so M {O M } by SMON. Hence, SMON implies that {O M } ∼ M , and so V (M ) = V ({O M }) by Theorem 1. Moreover, since the information cost function c(.) is grounded,
where the second equality follows from the definition of an oracle act in (67). Thus, (ii) holds. Now assume that (ii) holds. By Theorem 1, for any p ∈ ∆(S × Σ)
To show that c must be equal to 0, let p ∈ ∆ π (S × Σ). Take any K ∈ K 0 . By (ii) it follows that m(K ) ∼ {O m(K ) }, and so K ∼ * K O m(K ) . Thus by Lemma 2,
where the last equality follows from p S = π. By definition of an oracle act, we see that (Eu • K ) ≤ Eu • K O m(K ) , and so S×Σ (Eu • K ) dp − S×Σ Eu • K O m(K ) dp ≤ 0 .
Thus, it follows from (45), (88) and (89) that c(p) = 0. This shows that (iii) holds and concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. In view of the preceding results, it is straightforward to see that
First, suppose that (i) holds; that is, let be variable attention preference relation which satisfies the axiom NA. Consider any menu M ∈ M. Since M is finite, there exists some -maximal element g ∈ M such that {g} {f } for all f ∈ M . By repeated application of NA, it follows that {g} ∼ M , and so V (M ) = V ({g}) by Theorem 1. Also, since the information cost function c(.) is grounded, for any singleton menu {f } ⊂ M , V ({f }) = S Eu[f (s)]dπ(s) by Theorem (1). Hence, as {g} {f } for all f ∈ M , infer that V ({g}) = max f ∈M S Eu[f (s)]dπ(s), showing that (ii) holds. Now suppose that (ii) holds. By Theorem 1, for any p ∈ ∆(S × Σ)
In order to show that c must be equal to ∞, let p ∈ ∆ π (S × Σ)\∆ π (S × Σ). Then there must exist some signal σ * ∈ Σ such that the corresponding posterior distribution p(.|σ * ) = π. By definition of a conditional distribution, p Σ (σ * ) > 0. Now let f, g ∈ F such that {f } {g} and S Eu[g(s)]dp(s|σ * ) > S Eu[f (s)]dp(s|σ * ) .
Let K ∈ K 0 be a superact such that for all (s, σ) ∈ S × Σ,
Thus, m(K) = {f, g} and, since (ii) holds, m(K) ∼ {f }. Therefore K ∼ * K f , and so by Lemma 2,
where the last equality follows from p S = π. Thus, by (45), (92) and (90),
Since u is unbounded, the right hand side of above inequality can be arbitrarily large. Hence, infer that c(p) = ∞, establishing that (iii) holds.
